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           Dominions: Law, Literature and the Right to Death  
PETER FITZPATRICK*
 
The ‘curious right’ attending modernity and revealed in Blanchot’s ‘Literature And 
the Right to Death’ could be readily reduced to that sovereign right to take life which 
ultimately subordinates law. Yet, so the argument runs, with that same curious right 
law surpasses sovereignty. And it does so by way of its similarity to literature. What 
will uncover that surpassing by law, and by literature, will be a pervasive concern 
with death as the horizon of the law. 
 
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.1
 
DEATH AS THE HORIZON OF THE LAW 
 
The affinity between law and death is usually put in terms of law’s pretension to 
finality. Taking indicative aperçus from Blanchot, this is law as ‘the end’, as 
 
* School of Law, Birkbeck, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, England 
 
As with so much else, this paper was generated in discussions with Adam 
Thurschwell and Colin Perrin. My precarious belief in it was sustained by Carrol 
Clarkson, Hillis Miller, and Johan van der Walt. Costas Douzinas provoked further 
thought on sovereignty. 
 
1 W. Stevens, ‘The Snow Man’ in Selected Poems (1965) 7.  
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antithetical to ‘life itself’.2 And in a way Blanchot would go so far as to subordinate 
law to death for, so he finds, law is ‘less the command that has death as its sanction, 
than death itself wearing the face of law’; this ‘death is always the horizon of the 
law’.3 The thought is hardly original. When death is seen as something like a 
constituent limit of law, this is law in its avowal of certainty and predictability, law ‘in 
its origin, in its very order’.4 Yet it is revealing, and this is a point I will come to later, 
that the association between law and death is so often seen in terms of an ultimate or 
final assertion that is sovereign, either the law itself as sovereign or law as an 
‘instrument’ of sovereignty, a giving effect to ‘the right of death of the sovereign’.5  
Almost in spite of all this, death is also for Blanchot the horizon of the law in quite 
another way. Again, this thought does not put a great strain on originality, even if it 
will prove to be a more productive one. Here the horizon does not simply contain but, 
rather, connects integrally with what is beyond, marks some commonality with what 
 
 
2 M. Blanchot, The Madness of the Day, trans. L. Davis (1981) 16; M. Blanchot, The 
Infinite Conversation, trans. S. Hanson (1993) 225. 
 
3 M. Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, trans. L. Davis (1992) 24-5.  
 
4 J. Derrida, ‘Force of Law: “The Mystical Foundations of Authority”’, trans. M. 
Quaintance, in J. Derrida, Acts of Religion (2002) 276. 
 
5 J. Locke, “The Second Treatise of Government,” in Two Treatises of Government  
(1965) 308; I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. J. Ladd (1965) 
331-3; M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. 
Sheridan (1979) 49; and for the quotation M. Dean, Governmentality: Power and 
Rule in Modern Society (1999) 105.  
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is beyond, or the possibility of it. The horizon thence becomes not only the condition 
and quality of law’s contained and distinct existence but also an opening onto all that 
lies beyond and is other to that existence. It is in this way that, for Blanchot, death 
‘raises existence to being’, that ‘death becomes being’.6 This death ‘is man’s 
possibility, his chance, it is through death that the future of a finished world is still 
there for us’.7 And this is death as a liberated ‘nothingness’, a nothingness which ‘is 
the creator of the world in man’.8 Death as horizon here is not only the end but also 
the beginning, the opening to and making possible of all that can come from being to 
existence: death is ‘the Other’.9 For death as this horizon of the law, however, what 
we have with Blanchot is not now an explicit affinity between death and law but, 
rather, parallel descriptions. So, law for Blanchot is (also) that which is quite ‘lacking’ 
in fixity, quite uncontained and unsubordinated, a self-affirmation made ‘without 
reference to anything higher: to it alone, pure transcendence’.10 This law takes its 
instituted existence from a being beyond. ‘Let us grant’, says Blanchot, ‘that the law 
is obsessed with exteriority, by that which beleaguers it and from which it separates 
 
6 M. Blanchot, ‘Literature And the Right to Death’, trans. L. Davis, in M. Blanchot, 
The Station Hill Blanchot Reader: Fiction & Literary Essays (1999) 391-2. 
 
7  id., p. 392. 
 
8 id., pp. 398-9. 
 
9 M. Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. A. Smock (1995) 19. 
 
10 Blanchot, op. cit., n.3, p.25. 
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via the very separation that institutes it as form, in the very movement by which it 
formulates this exteriority as law’.11 Such law is the same as what Blanchot would 
also see as the law of the law, see as ‘a responsibility…towards the Other’ that is 
‘irreducible to all forms of legality through which one necessarily tries to regulate it’, 
but which ultimately ‘cannot be enounced in any already formulated language’.12  
Thence, the achingly simple point of this paper becomes that, no matter how 
‘necessary’ this regulation, for law to be law nothing can be placed before it. Or that 
which is placed before it can only be nothing.13 This no-thing is for Blanchot ‘the 
savage freedom of the negative essence’ that emerges from speech being insufficient 
‘for the truth it contains’, a truth always denied in the enounced.14 This truth has its 
revenge, so to speak, in the constant corruption of the enounced, in the ‘ruin’ of any 
‘work’, in the ‘sickness’ of words, a sickness which is also their ‘health’ – the 
generative condition of their relation to the world, of their constituent connection to 
the nothingness of being.15 Likewise, law for Blanchot, that law ‘obsessed with [an] 
exteriority which ‘institutes it as form’ and from which it wrenches existence, such 
 
11 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 2 (1993), p. 434. 
 
12 M. Blanchot, The Unavowable Community, trans. P. Joris (1988) 43. 
 
13 id., p.368. 
 
14 cf. H. Cixous, Readings: The Poetics of Blanchot, Joyce, Kafka, Kleist, Lispector,   
and Tsvetayeva, trans. V. A. Conley (1991) 21. 
 
15 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 6, p.382. 
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law ‘exists only in regard to its transgression-infraction’.16 In its ‘ruin’, its 
‘rottenness’, borrowing now from Derrida, the realized law continually slides into this 
unrealizable exteriority, an exteriority which in turn must be ‘cut’ into for law’s 
‘necessarily’ contained existence.17  
What we have here, in sum, are two laws or two deathly horizons of the law. One is 
the law inseparable from the nothingness of ‘its’ exteriority, the law which, as Cixous 
says, ‘does not exist’, ‘has no material inside’.18 This is a law which can only ever 
‘be’ other than what it ‘is’, always dying in its deliquescence. But not yet. What still 
insists is the invariant law which in its determinate existence cannot be other than 
what it is, dying in a desolate stasis. This ambivalence provokes a search in-between 
its two dimensions, a search for the domain of Blanchot’s ‘literature’, that literature 
which ‘is the work of death in the world’.19  
 
LAW LIKE LITERATURE 
 
Such literature is an ‘opening’ to what is beyond, to alterity and possibility, to ‘what is 
when there is no more world’, or ‘to what would be if there were no world’, to ‘the 
 
16 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 3, p.24; Blanchot, op. cit., n. 2 (1993), p.434. 
 
17 Derrida, op. cit., n.4, pp. 252, 273. 
 
18 Cixous, op. cit., n. 13, p.18. 
 
19 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 6, p.393. 
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void’.20 But this void is of the kind encountered by Blanchot’s protagonist in The 
Madness of the Day for whom it was disappointing, a void which inexorably becomes 
‘a presence’ and protean: ‘one realizes the void, one creates a work’.21 Between the 
realized and the unrealizable, between the appropriated and that which is still ‘ours for 
being nobody’s’, there is a ‘shifting’, a ‘passing’, a ‘movement’ impelled by ‘a 
marvellous force’ which is the impossibility of the movement being otherwise.22 This 
is an activity always situated, an emplaced ‘affirmation’, ‘an operation’ which cannot 
be separated ‘from its results’.23  
Literature for Blanchot is a work like any other – he instances building a stove – 
even if it is such ‘to an outstanding degree’.24 Law and literature, it could now be 
said, share the same ambivalence between existent instantiation and what is ever 
beyond yet incipient in it.25 The comparison between law and literature more usually 
points to their opposition of course. Literature’s realms of the imagined and the 
 
 
20 id., p.388; and see C. Fynsk, Language and Relation…that there is language, 
(1996) 238-9. 
 
21 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 2 (1981), p.8; Blanchot, op. cit., n. 6, p.395; and Fynsk, op. 
cit., n.20, p.238. 
 
22 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 12, p.29; Blanchot, op. cit., n.6, pp. 363, 365, 369, 387, 389. 
 
23 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 6, pp. 365, 397. 
 
24 id., p.371. 
 
25 For a pointed and brilliant account of the similarity see P. Tuitt, Race, Law, 
Resistance, (in press) chapter 5. 
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possible oppose the all-too-solid certainty of law – the law-confounding power of 
Plato’s poets for example.26 Yet it is exactly the aspect of literature to which Plato 
would object, to its illimitable inventiveness and its quality of fiction, which impels 
law’s making, for law is only called upon to affirm some certainty in the face of 
uncertainty. And despite the incessant jurisprudential efforts to render law as fact, 
society, economy, and so on, it refuses being in ‘a world sapped by crude existence’.27 
Peremptorily,  the legal fiction can illustrate the formative location of law beyond 
existence, for with the fiction the enounced content of the particular law remains the 
same whereas operatively, and by way of the fiction, that content has changed to its 
opposite. So, and for example, in enounced Roman law certain litigation could only 
be initiated by a Roman citizen but foreign litigants were able to do the same because 
of a fiction deeming them to be citizens for the purpose.28 Thus, in Blanchot’s terms, 
a fiction is ‘truth and also indifference to truth’.29  
 
LAW’S ENABLING 
 
 
 
26 Plato, The Laws of Plato, trans. T. L. Pangle (1980) para. 656c. 
 
27 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 6 p.395 for the quote. 
 
28 H. Maine, Ancient Law (1931) 21. 
 
29 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 6, pp.396-7. 
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What Blanchot’s ‘literature’ does not give us and what law does is a characteristic 
conceptualization of that which is in-between being, with its possibility, and a worldly 
existent. Granted, in its vacuity, in its rejection of any determinant anteriority, law 
dependently absorbs the concepts taken from its ‘context’.30 Yet law invests these 
concepts with the imminent possibility of a being otherwise so that they are not, even 
in their own explicit terms, exhausted by presence. 
Let me take, with inexcusable brevity, some of what could be called law’s enabling 
concepts so as to show how in them the nothingness and the possibility of being 
subsists with the determinate and the actuality of existence. Taking equality, equality 
before the law: in law’s irreducible openness, in its not being tied to any existent 
differentiation, there is ever within it an incipience of equality. That ‘pure’ equality 
can only be before or anterior to the law made determinate, for with the coming to 
determinate existence differentiation and inequality will always supervene. Thence 
equality endures in a shrunken life of ‘more or less’. Impartiality as an enabling 
concept can be seen in the same way. Law’s lack of ties to the existent inclines 
towards a lack of attachment in law’s ‘application’. But what is, in Locke’s terms, 
law’s being needful of ‘a known and indifferent Judge’ is not finally feasible since the 
 
30 Thus the law in Blanchot’s The Madness of the Day is totally dependent on the 
protagonist but she, the law, ‘treacherously’ elevates him only to elevate herself 
above him: Blanchot, op. cit., n. 2 (1981), pp.14-16. 
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disregard of difference becomes inexorably compromised when judge and judgement 
are made known in the determinate scene of application.31  
Another telling example comes from the requirement that laws be ‘general’. 
Because of this requirement, it used often to be said that a decision confined to a 
particular determination does not count as law.32 Yet the ultimate way in which law is 
made determinate is in the decision, and the decision will always be specific. Neither 
the decision nor the circumstances provoking it will ever be exactly repeatable or 
repeated. Yet, if the general cannot find itself in law’s determinate existence, it cannot 
be so general that it falls completely into nothingness and has no bearing on anything 
specific, no operative content at all. Hence the common and paradoxical requirement 
that law’s ‘generality must be specific’.33 Perhaps the ur-instance of an enabling 
concept in law could be that of ‘responsibility’ and I will draw on that as a bridge 
back to Blanchot’s concept of a responsibility which ‘is’ the law of the law, that 
responsibility or, in an archaic usage, responsability  ‘towards the Other’ which is 
‘necessarily regulated’ in the making of the determinate law.34 In this inexorable 
narrowing there is a setting of law’s responsive range. Yet law must, to be law, 
 
31 Locke, op. cit., n. 5, p.396. 
 
32 e.g. id., p.409; J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. M. Cranston (1968) 82. 
 
33 F. Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political 
Theory (1957) 28.  
 
34 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 12, p.43. 
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remain responsively open to what is within and beyond that range. For law ultimately 
to deny that responsiveness by inflicting death would be law's antithesis. 
 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH 
 
Which brings me, with a touch of inevitability, to Blanchot’s ‘right to death’. This is 
‘a curious right’ which emerges when the void, or the nothingness of being carried by 
literature, by law, has ‘in absolute freedom…become an event’.35 The voiding of 
existence is somehow made existent. He instances the Reign of Terror in the French 
Revolution. Here the generality of right has become universal, ‘pure abstraction’ – a 
universality which for the citizens comes to ‘negate the particular reality of their 
lives’, which fills possibility so completely that ‘in the end no one has a right to his 
life any longer, to his actually separate and physically distinct existence’.36 To be a 
citizen in this totalized event, to be a carrier of this strange or estranged right, is to be 
absolutely, is to lose the materiality of one’s distinct being. Totality realized allows of 
no being apart from itself. There remains no space for our own, our singular life. 
There ‘death is sovereign’.37  
 
35 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 6, p.375 – his emphasis; and cf. p.379. 
 
36 id., p.376; cf. Blanchot, op. cit., n. 2 (1993), p.225. 
 
37 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 6, p.378. 
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Here, then, is a seeming affinity, even identity between death and sovereignty 
which would go to confirm the sovereign ‘right to death’, the right to stop our 
existence, even the right to our existence. And classically, sovereignty, like literature 
and like law, assumed a determinate, an emplaced existence yet would extend to all 
possibility. This marvellous combination was effected, after a fashion, through a 
transcendent reference joining specific rule to deific scope. Without that reference, 
sovereignty persists as what Derrida calls a ‘secularized theological concept’.38 This 
sovereignty ‘throned behind / Death…heeds but hides, bodes but abides…’, 
borrowing from Hopkins.39 With its claim to a completeness yet specificity of power, 
this is a sovereignty to which law has proved susceptible. Law’s constituent 
imperative that nothing can be placed before it leaves it a vacuity. It must ever 
respond to and depend on an ‘outside’ for its contents and, in much philosophical and 
in even more jurisprudential thought, sovereignty has been assertively advanced as 
that which endows law with content. 
All of which would seem to wrap things up and you, dear reader, may be almost as 
relieved as I to conclude at that, but there would remain the problem that the right to 
death imports the exact opposite. It is ‘each person’, ‘every citizen’ who ‘has a right 
 
38 J. Derrida, 2001. ‘A Discussion with Jacques Derrida,’ (2001) Theory and Event 5, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.1derrida.html.  
 
39 G. M. Hopkins, ‘The Wreck of the Deutschland’, in The Poetic Works of Gerald 
Manley Hopkins (1990) 127. 
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to death’, and not the sovereign.40 For Blanchot, a ‘sovereign amplitude’ does 
‘nothing’.41 We may discern what the sovereign may do positively or determinately 
by filtering the right to death through ‘a simple and redoubtable logic’ – borrowing 
the phrase, if not the confidence, from Nancy.42 For ‘each person’, each particulate in 
its ‘absolute’ and ‘free’ completeness, to be-with other persons, being still distinct yet 
in common, each would have to be the same as the other. Distinctness would thence 
be lost. Alternatively, if the ‘absolute’ distinctness of each is to be preserved, then 
there would be as many operative versions of what is in common as there are 
particulates, and thence the utter dissipation of commonality. The seemingly 
paradoxical price, then, of the distinctness of each in their relation to each other is the 
existence of some determinate being-in-common inhabiting and limiting each ‘in’ 
their very distinctness. 
This commonality enabling distinct being, a commonality which is a determinate or 
determinable being-in-common, does provide a place for sovereignty. It is, however, a 
place that has been effectively occupied by other modes besides a monadic 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is but one specific mode of rule. As such it depends 
integrally on law – reversing now the standard ascription of law’s dependence on 
sovereignty. Granted there can be sovereign acts apart from law, acts sustained for 
 
40 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 6, p.376. 
 
41 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 12, p.32. 
 
42 J.-L. Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. P. Connor (1991) 4. 
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example by commitment to such neo-sacral entities as nation, commitment unto death, 
yet if sovereignty is to endure beyond the evanescence of the act, if it is to extend 
indefinitely yet enclose itself, if it is to subsist determinately yet traject to what is 
beyond its existence ‘for the time being’, sovereignty has to be bound to law. The 
condition of being sovereign is a claim of or to right. No amount of asserting the 
existence of a sovereign condition can make the qualitative leap to being-in-right. And 
what the sovereign condition always lacks in being stretched between determinate 
existence and the possibility that is within being has always to be constituently 
integrated into it. Law is the amenable means of so doing, of sovereignty’s thence 
being sustainedly within the world. The sovereign ability to come adaptively to ‘[a]ll 
things counter, original, spare, strange’, borrowing from Hopkins again, is an ability 
carried and sustained by law through its intrinsic inability to be bound to any pre-
existent, its generative incompleteness and labile openness.43 Yet if law carries 
sovereignty through Blanchot’s ‘night’ of nothingness and possibility, it also and 
‘necessarily’ returns it to the ‘day’ of an ‘enounced’ existence, and of this returning 
there can be ‘no end’ for ‘there is no possibility of being done with the day, with the 
meaning of things, with hope…’.44  
 
 
43 Hopkins, ‘Pied Beauty’, in Hopkins, op. cit., n.39, p.144. 
 
44 Blanchot, op. cit., n. 12, p. 43; M.Blanchot,  The Work of Fire, trans. C. Mandel   
    (1995) 8.           
